
















I. Contextualizing Reconciliation 
The ideal of consilience - the inductive concurrence of seemingly disparate ways 
of thinking into a single, unified, all-encompassing intellectual system - or more simply 
put, "unified leaming,,,i - has been largely set aside since the rise of the industrial age 
and the championing of the industrious, better-be it individualized mind of the 
enlightenment. The Catholic Church was the last western world-dominant institution to 
actively perpetuate and work according to the rubric of a unified field of knowledge. Our 
thoughts and everything else were under God and indivisible: our ethics and our physics 
alike were the immaterial idea-stuff of the divine, benevolently nudging us towards some 
golden age. But, with grandiloquence and a hell-uv' -a-lot of liberation rhetoric, reason 
found itself in a dominant position within the hegemonyii of intellectual and academic 
discourse. A preference for reasonability and individuation dictated that we divide up our 
disciplines, that we allow each scholar to pursue a particular field of interest without 
insisting that that field collapse into theology in its most fundamental stages. !twas 
either that our humanist logics were not sophisticated enough to synthesize all of the 
natural or conceptual oppositions flourishing at that time, or that we had coine to 
disregard the ironically rigorous project of righteousness and truthjust enough to see a 
use and a truth of a differing quality in dividing up our conceptual schemes. The 
separation of church and state might be seen as a manifestation of this "divided front" 
approach. Perhaps it was with the same spirit that William Wordsworth and William 
Blake distinguished their subject matter - literature and poetry - from others with a sense 
of purpose, offering an aesthetics and an ethics to an increasingly scientific, humanistic 
intellectual community that seemed to them sorely lacking in emotionality and 
spirituality. These, perhaps, were steps in a process of genesis: genesis as religious 
beginning: the beginning of a modem academic or intellectual paganism. 
This is not to argue that no one has sought consilience during or in the wake of 
the enlightenment. In fact, for many scientists, it has been an explicitly stated project. 
Francis Bacon, who is often considered a prophet of modem science, is interested in 
drawing up a comprehensive" ... map," " ... a small globe of the intellectual world."iii 
Albert Einstein writes, "It is a wonderful feeling to recognize the unity of a complex of 
phenomena that to direct observation appear to be quite separate things."iv But while 
science might hold up consilience as an ideal, a goal, even Einstein is prepared to admit 
that the scientific endeavor is separate from humankind's ethical maturation. This must 
have been abundantly clear to Einstein and the rest of the theoretical physicists who laid 
the groundwork for the development and production of the atomic bomb. Regardless of 
the complexity and elaboration of atomic physics, it could not recommend an ethics or a 
politics of enactment based solely on the premises of the hard science itself. 
This realization is widespread and generically applied in our contemporary 
cultural thinking. 
"Neither any practice actually established anywhere in history nor any science could ever 
direct us to what we ought to desire. Could Darwin instruct those turtles on the 
Galapagos to desire to be different from what 'natural history' had made them?"V 
Here, there is a very definite division between the ethical "ought" and the is of "natural 
history." It is not precisely the same dichotomy as that between Einstein's physics and 
the politics of nuclear destruction - it is lacking in technological science what it makes up 
for in the natural, biological realm - but it carries with it an identical assumption about 









or ethics decides how to put the mechanism to work. That Darwin describes the natural 
economy while we orchestrate a polity which may or may not incorporate as little of the 
scientific/inevitable as possible. For Hayden White, it is the inherent project of science to 
dissociate itself from the subjective propensity, hope. Therefore, according to White, a 
good politics can only be un-scientific - visionary, hope driven. Works of literature 
rather than science are "documents attesting to the reality of the desire for redemption."vi 
As soon as the literary, which means the utopian for White, starts "providing justification 
for the vision of its possible realization, [it] enters into contention with practice, common 
sense, and science alike."vii The authors of the Constitution of the United States exposit 
and put to work a philosophy that is not so extreme as White's, but it accounts for the 
same antagonism between what is understood to be natural and vulgar and what will be 
put in place to surmount that unfortunate natural situation. Thomas Jefferson writes, "In 
questions of power, let no more be said of confidence in man, but bind him down from 
mischief, by the chains of the Constitution." Thomas Paine also understands the use of 
the Constitution in this way: "[it is] ... to restrain and regulate the wild impulse of 
power." Jefferson and Paine distrust the will to power in humankind. They consider the 
"impulse" to be a constitutive force of human nature. This is of humanity and immediate 
human history is not the prescriptive force in the Constitution though. According to one 
contemporary admirer of the document, "It was [Jefferson's and Paine's] great gift to be 
able to take a Hobbesian view of human life without applying a Hobbesian solution."viii 
"Publius" (either Madison or Hamilton), admittedly an opponent of Jefferson's, shares 
the same idea about the adversarial relationship that must exist between human nature 
and government: "What is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human 
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nature? lfmen [and women] were angels, no government would be needed."ix For both 
White and the framers of our Constitution then, the literary - the hopeful and visionary as 
writing - holds an active place in cultural discourse. Literature, according to this scheme, 
must be informed by the natural (in at least so far as it is responding to it), but it must 
also be creative, prescriptive, and finally, culturally affective. 
It seems clear that we are working within a culture that purposely divides its fields 
of knowledge. It will be taken as a matter of fact that no time in history is without its 
factions - without a fractionality of visions and practices. For that reason, it is admittedly 
somewhat misleading to make such a sweeping generalization about the conceptual 
system to which contemporary American and western culture in general adhere. 
Certainly, scientists that make consilience their ends, or religious fundamentalists who 
would have God running our politics again are as much a part of this culture as the 
pluralists. But the fact is that their ideologies are not dominant. It is important to see any 
moment in history as a I?ultitudinous hegemony rather than a totally coherent, unified 
trend. It is, at the same time, however, useful to consider the dominant forces within that 
hegemony. The generalization that "we" do not work according to a model of intellectual 
or epistemological consilience will be made because it is - in so far as it is a conscious 
generalization - useful for understanding our contemporary circumstances. 
II. Reconciliation 
" ... View the boundary between the scientific and literary cultures not as a territorial line 
but as a broad and mostly unexplored terrain awaiting cooperative entry from both 









I am writing an English paper about science. I am interested in the way the two 
fields become each other. If this sounds like a thesis for consilience, that is because it is, 
in part. Perhaps, a better term would be "reconciliation" or "reconcilience:" 
reconciliation as reinstating a mutual respect and a common interest in cooperation while 
observing individual difference. It is not my purpose to systematically distill all of the 
demarcated academic disciplines into concurrence. I am not ultimately interested in the 
same kind of consilience as E.O. Wilson. That Physics is Chemistry is Biology is 
Economics is Politics mayor may not be true, but that shouldn't, in itself, imply a 
hierarchy. It is self evident that ethical peopleare also biological people; it is not evident 
which they are first and foremost. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, it is equally unconvincing that science is 
completely literary, creating/reading/rediscovering-in-the-always-already the "natural 
laws of the universe" only by way of or mediated by a lexicon of culturally constructed 
meanings and values. Both of these approaches seem to me to be incorporating a 
totalizing, and thereby reactionary academic monotheism. Each approach seeks to 
identify a specific field of inquiry as that which is primary and foundational. 
What I am concerned with here is the fact that at some crucial point in the 
physical or the chemical or the biological understanding, the understanding can and does 
become narrativistic. This is not to invalidate the biological understanding, but rather to 
more fully identify its structure. In the same way that the Catholic Church sought to 
explain our existence by way of myth, so science must also mythologize. If we catch 
E.O. Wilson in the proper context, even he will agree. 
"To wit, people must belong to a tribe; they yearn to have a purpose larger than 
themselves. We are obliged by the deepest drives of the human spirit to make ourselves 
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more than animated dust, and we must have a story to tell about where we came from, 
and why we are here. Could Holy Writ be just the first literate attempt to explain the 
universe and make ourselves significant within it? Perhaps science is a continuation on 
new and better-tested ground to attain the same end. If so, than in that sense science is 
religion liberated and writ large ... Preferring a search for objective reality over revelation 
is another way of satisfying religious hunger."xi 
That science has "a story to tell .. . [about] why we are here" or about what is or is not 
possible according to natural Law - biological destiny - suggests that there is a 
narrativistic element in science. As Wilson understands it, science adheres to the 
previously formulated rules for the literary (Jefferson's and White's); it is prescriptive-
not just mechanical. It can be hopeful or stifling and damning of hope. It can be 
progressive: it has become inextricably bound with our culture's notion of progress. Or it 
can be conservative, setting limitations on possibility. 
Science has another narrativistic aspect, as well: that it is created by human 
authors. Science must not be treated as a perfect, and thereby impersonal mind -
apprehending from nowhere-in-space-time/objectivity. It must have a body too, housing 
a consciousness, with motivations and biases that can be likened to those of our 
individualized consciousnesses. These always-creating, human consciousnesses, bound 
up with and to some extent, subject to the physical, are the authors of science, and not 
purely perceiving, one-for-one sign system discoverers. As Niels Bohr's character in the 
contemporary play about theoretical physics, Copenhagen, puts it, 
"measurement is no longer considered an impersonal event that occurs with universal 
impartiality; [it is] a human act, carried out from a specific point of view in time and 
space."xii 
In my edition of the The Origin of the Species the preface reads, "Each [great 
work] (in the article, "great" explicitly means "Plato" and "Aristotle, " and also, "The 






having played a part in the creative or autoevolutionary development of [human ]kind 
which we call the civilizing process."xiii I am not willing to go so far as to say that every 
great work - be it of literature or science - makes us more civilized, but I do think this 
type of inc1usionary thinking about culturally significant work, regardless of the field, is 
worth pursuing. It is towards the kind of reconciliation I am interested in here. It 
implicitly permits science to have a social function beyond that of laboratory mechanics 
and, in so doing, it incorporates science into a larger category of cultural literature. 
Again, this is not to have science collapse into the literary totally. Nor is it to have 
science determine all of our social and even artistic urges. It is to allow science and 
literature to inhabit a common ground of human inquiry, while respecting the difference 
between the two projects. 
In the body of this paper, I will be examining metascientific narratives. That is, I 
will be reading readings of science. I am a student of "language and literature," not 
Science, so I will not treat particular scientific fields in too much depth. I will treat the 
science that self-conscious, healthy-doubting and/or rationally affirming scientists treat in 
their metasciences. Particular scientific methods and theories will be taken up as 
examples or illustrations of larger, thematically pervasive scientific methodologies. On 
this level, I do not pretend to prescribe particular solutions or specialized treatments ,for 
isolated problems. But, by virtue of my very general approach, I should be able to make 
some basic philosophical and practical suggestions for the whole body of science as a 
general human, scientific endeavor. By stressing the human in the scientific, and 
obscuring the possibility of absolute objectivity, I will be looking toward a science that 
incorporates and is advised by the humanities. 
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Likewise, in so far as my work here is a humanistic meta metascience, I will have 
something to say not only about science, as it may come to incorporate the literary in its 
constitutive assumptions and methodologies, but also about literary studies, as a meta-
English discourse. Getting over post-structuralism has been the name of the game for 
many literary theorists in the last forty or fifty years. I am not offering reconciliation as 
an innovative extension of post-structuralism, but as is appropriate to the term, I am 
suggesting reconciliation between the post-structural reader and the modernist 
god/author, or between Derrida and the structuralist-scientist looking to distill meaning 
from the formal, to discover between binary oppositions the truth of the text. I am 
allowing voice back into the text, but only as voice and not as scripture-speaker or 
commandment-teller-of-Truth. I am respecting the efforts of structuralism to uncover 
"the truth [that] is out there" in the text, but not treating truth as discovery only. This 
means the reader must work to understand the subject (speaking) in the text - he or she 
must be a sensitive reader - and will not be humored or applauded for fancy 
ventriloquism: making the text talk whatever. However, I will refuse to fall back on 
objectivity as the ends for literary or scientific analysis. The fact is that readers create the 
narrative too. It is our cooperative investment with the author or our cognitive 
positioning and repositioning of the textual form that constitutes the nature and quality of 
our interpretations. Again, this is not to argue for the tyranny of the author or, on the 
other hand, the totally solipsistic freedom of the reader, but rather, some middle ground: a 
reconciliation: a place where the superstitious pre-modem, the objectivity-interested 
modern, and the relativistic post-modem acknowledge each other. 
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I do not mean my amendments to science or my suggestions to literary studies as 
disparate, isolated advices; I am also looking for a particular reconciliation between the 
two disciplines. This will mean a transformative curriculum (it is not a transformed 
curriculum because the potential program will be admittedly reactionary and gradual: in a 
process ofreconceiveing a role for the artistic, or precisely, the literary in the humanities 
and including the literary in the sciences). We are heading toward a kind of 
interdisciplinary checks-and-balances: an academic reform program, a cultural studies, a 
conciliatory conversation between all of the culture's readers and authors/writers. It is in 
this kind of program that I hope to be actively taking part in the present paper. The aim 
will be to encourage a holistic kind of thoughtfulness, rather than a separated, specialized 
sort of inquiry . We will not have pure theoreticians or experimental mechanics, nor will 
we have only aesthetes; we will flood the academy with a new set of critically minded, 
trained, but not on some-one-track, cooperative agents, able to engage a common 
contemporaneity of circumstances. This, above all else, will make academics matter 
more. 
Despite my lack of formal training in the field, it should be admitted that I will 
play the scientist in this paper: like a general practitioner, I will "examine" and "treat ... 
the whole body of science" (my words at the bottom of page #7). I will attempt to 
distance myself (become objective?) from some basic cultural assumptions and make 
claims that underhandedly play truth concepts as trump cards. But, both my 
methodology and my conclusions about science will be narrativistic. They will be 
creative and explanatory in a way that science proper would prefer not to allow itself to 
be. In so far as this is true, I am a student of literature as well. If I am both then, I am 
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enacting a sort of consilience, a consilience that, I argue, is necessarily mirrored in the 
actual disciplines. The narrativistic aspect of science should not render it illegitimate as a 
progressive intellectual endeavor any more than it should render the study of literature 
illegitimate. It should, however, remind us that both fields of inquiry have an 
epistemological perimeter. 
We are engaging a post-modem sensibility here - that is, a sensibility owing to 
the collective cultural intuition that modern science is not able to live up to its and our 
hopes of totally and utterly demystifying the universe, setting apart a single, perfectly 
correlative, numerical or symbolic value for every type and every bit of raw existence. 
We are, by including the narrativistic in science, allowing the possibility for a proliferate 
world. However, solipsism is not our end. That the center will not hold does not mean 
we can not work according to an approximate or consented to concentrism. If the 
question is pushed to its limits, we must admit that we believe in the object. The 
postulate is that we believe or experience in the subject. Based on our belief and our 
understanding of common matter (atoms and aspirations for happiness) we can, but more 
importantly, we should treat the object as another subject. Because we can influence its 
meaning while it can influence ours, we ought to treat it/"thou"xiv as a cooperative 
partner. This is the concurrence of nature and culture, leaving both with 
narrativistic/created qualities and scientific/determining ones. It is also the reconciliation 
between the disciplines of Science and Literature, who have been at odds long enough to 
want to ignore each other and ignored each other long enough to suffer mutual 




" ... Efforts to come to linguistic terms with the non-representability, historical 
contingency, artefactuality, and yet spontaneity, necessity, fragility, and stunning 
profusions of 'nature' can help us refigure the kind of persons we might be. " 
-Donna J HarawayXV 
In the same way that history can be understood as storytelling, science can be 
understood as narrative. If you read The People's History of the United States, by 
Howard Zinn you are going to get one account of American history. If you read The 
Americans: The Democratic Experience, by Daniel Boorstin you are most assuredly 
going to get another. Presumably, the events of American history are the same for 
Howard Zinn, Daniel Boorstin, you and I. But we read history books for more than a 
simple list of facts and events in history. History itself is more than a list of facts. 
History makes sense of passed events. It offers an explanation, thereby positing the 
disposition of the present. The explanation is almost never explicit or self-conscious. 
Rather, it takes the form of a narrative. Inscribed in the particular historical narrative is a 
coherent system of undoubted causal influences and value assumptions that orient and 
allocate significance to specific events. That there are different histories of the same 
events testifies to the fact that any particular historical explanation will be from an 
unavoidably limited point of view. Indeed, a history will have an author. The terms the 
author chooses to fit passed actualities into - the words telling a history - are inherently 
partial and exclusionary. 
In science, explanation takes on a narrative form, as well. This time, rather than 
explaining historical, political events, it is an explanation of natural phenomena: 
molecular relationships, biological ones, and behavioral or instinctual ones (or, as Wilson 
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would have it, molecular as biological, and biological as behavioral). Again, there is no 
question whether or not natural molecular, cellular or behavioral events occur; it is a 
question of what these events mean. The way in which we make sense of these events 
will constitute an explanatory narrative .. 
Including the narrativistic in science, while preserving a respect for the field as 
usefully separate from Literature, can lead to two types of critiques of science. The first, 
which will be dealt with presently, is to attribute narrativistic, creative qualities to science 
in a pejorative way. This is not to revise the mission and constitution of science, but 
rather to attempt to perform a more rigorous, true science in a place where it has been 
imperfectly performed in the past, either purposely or by genuine error. The second, 
which will be dealt with in later sections, is to realize the inevitability of narrativistic 
science and consequently, to look to revise the narrativistic (as well as the purely factual 
elements) of a theory, without looking to dispose of them altogether, as impurities of 
analysis. 
Richard C. Lewontin, the Alexander Agassiz chair of Zoology at Harvard 
University, claims that modem-day science is an instrument for preserving and 
perpetuating cultural dominance, wielded by those who have a vested interest in the 
present state of order. He equates science, as it is institutionalized today, with the fascist, 
feudal, and hierarchical Catholic Church. Fundamental to this equation is the idea that 
the dominant individual or group in society must appeal to something outside of the 
culture's constructions in order to secure its legitimacy. According to Lewontin's 
scheme, objectivity is the built-in choice for science. 
"F or an institution to explain the world so as to make the world legitimate, it must 
possess several features. First, the institution as a whole must appear to derive from 
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sources outside of ordinary human struggle. It must not seem to be the creation of 
political, economic, or social forces, but to descend into society from a supra-human 
source. Second, the ideas, pronouncements, rules, and results of the institution's activity 
must have a validity and a transcendent truth that goes beyond any possibility of human 
compromise or human error. Its explanations and pronouncements must seem to be true 
in an absolute sense and to derive somehow from an absolute source. They must be true 
for all time and all place. And finally, the institution must have a certain mystical and 
veiled quality so that its innermost operation is not completely transparent to everyone. It 
must have an esoteric language, which needs to be explained to the ordinary person by 
those who are especially knowledgeable and who can intervene between every day life 
and mysterious sources of understanding and knowledge. "xvi 
Lewontin focuses his concerns about science on Molecular Biology (Genetics), 
Evolutionary Biology and Sociobiology, in particular. 
Taking a social-constructivist's tack against the theory of "natural selection," 
Lewontin argues that Darwin - a force to be reckoned with in and of himself, but also 
undoubtedly serving as the foundational thinker for E.O. Wilson's later work in 
Sociobiology - made sense of the natural economy because of the way he was culturally 
accustomed to thinking about commerce and competition. Lewontin is not willing to do 
away with the explanatory force of Darwin altogether. He unflinchingly assumes the 
basic idea that organisms have evolved on the earth over the course of billions of years 
and that "we know this to be a natural process resulting from differential survivorship of 
different forms." "In this sense," he claims, "we all accept Darwinism as true."xvii But 
Lewontin takes Darwin to task on the particular dynamics of "differential survivorship." 
In not so many words, he is questioning the narrative that Darwin seems to be weaving 
between actual events in the evolution of organisms; he is questioning Darwin's 
prejudices as a plot spinner for nature. Ultimately, according to Lewontin, Darwin's 
theories are tarnished by the historical context out of which they are born and the author's 
economic and social biases. 
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"[Darwin] ... claimed there was a universal struggle for existence because more 
organisms were born than could survive and reproduce, and that in the course of that 
struggle for existence, those organisms who were more efficient, better designed, 
cleverer, and generally better built for the struggle would leave more offspring than the 
inferior kinds. As a consequence of this victory in the struggle for existence, 
evolutionary change occurred ... Darwin himself was conscious of the source for his ideas 
about the struggle for existence. He claimed that the idea for evolution by natural 
selection occurred to him after reading the famous, "Essay on Population" by Thomas 
Malthus ... The essay was an argument against the old English Poor Law, which Malthus 
thought too liberal."xviii 
Lewontin is critical of Darwin because of the politics that the theory of natural selection 
seems to be both born out of and working towards, but this is not the foundation on which 
he feels comfortable building his critique. The fact that Darwin has biases and writes his 
theory in terms of those biases, makes the theory false, in some conventionally scientific 
way. Of course, a conceptual framework that allows falsity must also have truth to judge 
by. And so, Science as an enterprise of objectivity remains intact while Darwin's theory 
of evolution specifically is up for discussion. It is the same modernist model for critique: 
the truth we know is in some way deluded with superstition or subjective bias; we will 
shed our superstitions and uncover the true truth. The bottom line for Lewontin in all of 
his critical strategies against science is that the purity and honor of the scientific endeavor 
is distorted, marred and misdirected by institutionalized and so legitimized avarice. He is 
critical of the Human Genome Project and the Pioneer Hybrid Seed Companyxix on these 
grounds. 
"A purely commercial interest has so successfully clothed itself in the claims of pure 
science that those claims are now taught as scientific gospel in university schools ... Once 
again, what appears to us in the mystical guise of pure science and objective knowledge 
about nature turns out, underneath, to be political, economic, and social ideology."xx 
Lewontin would be all to ready to take up a recent add from New Yorker magazine as an 




on the first page is a picture of the double helix and a caption that refers to the helix as a 
"ladder." The written section of the add on the adjacent page reads, 
"At the top of this ladder is a world without disease. Most disease is genetic. The faster 
scientists can sequence DNA, the faster they can pinpoint the causes of disease so cures 
can be developed. Agilent Technologies [a subsidiary of Hewlett-Packard] provides 
technologies that speed DNA analysis exponentially. It's a long way to climb, but we're 
giving science a big step up. "xxi 
Whether or not we agree with Lewontin's treatment of modem; commercially fueled 
science, we must admit that this add exemplifies the money-hungry object of his 
criticisms. 
If only we could live in a communist society where scientists are fully funded and 
able to pursue the truth with honesty and integrity instead of profit hungry eyes seems to 
be Lewontin's message in Biology as Ideology. Science, as it is, under capitalism, is 
only another factory house, albeit a prestigious one. It literally makes cars and 
microwaves; it just doesn't physically pull the lever or fit the door on the hinge. It works 
according to the principles of incentive so that it can collect a paycheck, and so long as it 
doesn't undermine the system it is indebted to, it will continue to be. And so will the 
system. 
"The study of DNA is an industry with high visibility, a claim on the public purse, the 
legitimacy of a science, and the appeal that it will alleviate individual and social 
suffering. So its basic ontological claim, of the dominance of the Master Molecule over 
the body physical and the body politic, becomes part of the general consciousness. "xxii 
The applications of Darwinism and genetics for Lewontin are,. again, modes of 
domination. Keeping with Hayden White's dichotomy between a science of is and a 
politics of what can or what should be, Lewontin suggests that focusing on the genetic 
factors in identity is like emphasizing the author in a work of literature. As one does not 
allow the reader the freedom to make meaning the other does not allow the biologically 
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bound individual to consciously make choices about the facets of their own identity. 
Identity has literally already been scripted in our chromosomes, "AGGACTT ... " 
" ... The importance of the Human Genome Project lies less in what it may, in fact, reveal 
about biology, and whether it may in the end lead to a successful therapeutic program for 
one or another illness, than in its validation and reinforcement of biological determinism 
as an explanation of all social and individual variation."xxiii 
Lewontin believes that biological determinism is not the actual truth of biological 
science; rather it is a myth put in place to perpetuate the power structure and the 
economic system. Genetics, for Lewontin, as it is commonly understood today, "[makes] 
the ideology of biological determinism complete ... [It provides] a theory of 
unchangeable human nature." Once human nature is unchangeable - or once "nature" is 
incorporated into the human constitution as a static concept - there can be no reasonable, 
realistic effort to make change. 
Lewontin is ultimately unable to traverse the boundary between science and 
literature. He observes the creative, narrativistic, mythologizing elements in modern 
science. But he is unable to step out of his laboratory and embrace these qualities. To 
embrace the narrativistic in science does not necessarily mean to embrace every narrative 
science constructs - it does not mean we need to understand the natural economy in terms 
of "the survival of the fittest." Lewontin could still take up his critique of Darwin 
without resorting to classical science and an enlightened either/or rhetoric of truth vs. 
mystification. 
For Lewontin, the fact that a science is a much a creation of its particular author 
or authors' biases (financial self-interest) as it is a representation of reality is a discredit 
to the science. But, according to the reconciliation posited here, Lewontin's notion of a 
dishonest, commercial science is very likely as "scientific" as any Marxist science that 
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might be conceived of as an alternative. That is, there is a necessary admixture of 
narrative, or Lewontin might say propaganda, and actual truth telling involved in any 
scientific discourse. Therein, the problem with Lewontin's capitalistic science is the 
same as it would be for Lewontin's ideal science: that these sciences ignore their own 
narrative aspects and work under the assumption that narrative is an isolated domain, 
proper only to students and scholars of literature. How would our approach change if we 
were to accept the narrativity of science and focus our critique on the particular values, 
implicit or explicit, conscious or unconscious, in that science? 
IIIB. The Scientific Consciousness 
Ifwe admit the narrativistic into science (admit that that thenarrativistic is there 
as an inevitability), it becomes important to explore the disposition of the authorial 
consciousness involved. Consciousness - so far as it is understood as a coherent, 
consistently self-distinguishing process of apprehensions - is a fundamentally repetitive 
phenomenon. It might be said that the repetition of self-reflection is the constitutive 
theme of consciousness. In so far as this, it is not to go too far to liken narrative and 
consciousness. If narrative form is what makes data make sense - if that is what arranges 
its significances - then narrative form might also serve as that which makes the self make 
sense. Theme in narrative is understood as significance by way of repetition. Theme in 
consciousness is understood as the repetitive re-cognition of self. 
In order for the scientific consciousness to make sense and remain intact it must 
maintain its themes. Otherwise it is left without an anchor in intelligibility - it is either a 
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raw set of data without any meaningful explanation to offer or it is an unproclaimed 
discipline - without a consistent academic identity, without a continuous set of 
ideological and methodological precepts - without self-reference or repeatability. It is 
almost always the project of science to classify, assign a type, a genus, distinguish the 
finite number of chemicals occurring in nature, and then outside of nature - in the lab. It 
can be said that science seeks out repetition, trend, theme in order to reinforce the 
premises of its consciousness. 
"We are not subtle enough to perceive that probably absolute flow of becoming; the 
permanent exists only thanks to our coarse organs which reduce and lead things to shared 
premises of vulgarity, whereas nothing exists in this form. A tree is a new thing at every 
instant; we affirm the form because we do not seize the subtlety of an absolute 
moment. "xxiv 
Nietzsche suggests that theme-searching is a shortcoming of science's, a "vulgarity." If 
science were not natrativistic-- if it did not incorporate a concept of theme, if it did not 
search for repetitions - it would be, at once, more accurate and unusable, unable to offer 
any explanation on the basis of predictability and repeatability; for Nietzsche, these no 
longer serve as attributes of a valid hypothesis, but rather, as symptoms of the analyst's 
"coarse organs." 
If there were to be a science more attuned to Nietzsche's "absolute flow of 
becoming," or, at least, a science that opened its doors wide enough to let a category 
escaper in, it would be difficult for this unfit-able phenomenon to be assimilated into the 
traditional scientific schematic of types. The cohesion of the scientific consciousness 
would thereby be compromised. 
"The breakdown of narrativity in a culture, group, or social class is a symptom of its 
having entered into a state of crisis. For with any weakening of the narrativizing 
capacity, the group looses its power to locate itself. .. "xxv 
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If we treat culture as collective self, a breakdown in cultural narrative would have to 
mean a lack of repetitions of the themes that make self-awareness possible. Ultimately, it 
would mean a breakdown of self as theme. 
In contemporary science, there is a "weakening of the narrativizing capacity." It 
is important to identify this "breakdown in narrativity" as an example of science's 
automatic compulsion to narrativize. The breakdown in narrativity is brought on by a 
field of phenomena that do not repeat the themes of classical science. Science, like any 
consciousness, can not cope without its narrative themes, its repetitions and affirmations 
of proper orientation and awareness. 
According to Evelyn Fox Keller, professional Biologist, specializing in 
"mathematical biophysics," and also Professor of History and Philosophy in the Program 
of "Science, Technology and Society" at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, it is 
proper to and inherent in the processes of scientific inquiry to "interpret" and discuss the 
meanings of phenomena. In fact, she argues, this is the only way in which workable 
scientific theories are developed. She observes that quantum mechanics has posed a 
unique difficulty in that it has resisted interpretation. 
"After more than fifty years of unquestionable success as a theory, quantum mechanics 
remains surrounded by questions of interpretation ... Discussions about the meaning of 
quantum mechanics are stymied as a result of the failure of physicists to formulate a 
cognitive paradigm adequate to their theory. .. Among physicists, a comfortable, stable, 
representation of the new integration required, especially by quantum mechanics, is yet to 
be achieved; its absence is reflected in a remarkable array of interpretations and partial 
accommodations, thinly veiled by a token conformity and consensus.,.,xxvi 
Keller attributes the difficulties physicists are having explaining quantum mechanics to a 
phenomenon that Jean Piaget calls "cognitive repression." Cognitive repression occurs 
individually or collectively when "[ a] schema which' cannot be integrated into the system 
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of conscious concepts is eliminated ... and repressed from conscious territory before it has 
penetrated there in any conceptualized form. "xxvii White might say that physicists are 
unable to locate quantum mechanics in or within the narrative of classical science. This 
inability to explain quantum mechanics would constitute the break down in narrativity 
then. If quantum mechanics is somehow so resistant to general scientific assumptions 
and categories that sense can not be made of it within the traditional paradigm, then, 
according to Piaget's theory' of cognitive repression, it will either be forced to fit 
somehow or it will be, as much as possible; ignored and unapplied. Does the fact that 
there is no definitive text book on quantum mechanics (according to Evelyn Fox Keller in 
1985, over fifty years after the success of the theory is relatively uncontested) suggest 
science's inability to observe the manifestations of its basic principles or, as is obviously 
more likely, science's lack of a narrative form - lack of an arsenal of naturally occurring 
themes - with which to make sense of the new physics? The latter may very well be the 
precise enactment of cognitive repression on the part of classical physics as a collective 
cognitive enterprise. This attests to the narrativity of the scientific consciousness and the 
vulnerability that should come with any self-reflexive, self-perpetuating consciousness. 
If we can agree to work with the concept of the scientific consciousness, what can be 
said, in psychoanalytic terms, about the subjective desires and possible neuroses of 
science? 
IIIC. A Psychoanalysis of the Authors of Objectivity: Reconciling Plato with 
"Pleasure" 
" ... Begin to chart a terrain that amounts to a psychosociology of scientific knowledge. " 
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-Evelyn Fox Kellerxxviii 
The perspective that science prizes (objectivity) is not some automatic human 
faculty with which we have been endowed in order to apprehend the true nature of things. 
Rather, it is an aspired to and preferred point of view, taught to budding scientists by the 
keepers of the tradition. Traditional science is conceived as any consciousness is 
conceived: with its own motivations and pursuits of pleasure. 
"The individual scientist of course does not choose his or her 'relation and perspective' 
freely; they are a part of the process of socialization into the scientific community and 
into the culture of which thatcommunity is a part. Relation and perspective thus 
constitute the first stage of naming ... [And] naming nature is the specialbusiness of 
science. "xxix. 
By achieving an objective "relation and perspective" to nature, science is able to 
accomplish its goal, knowledge. The word "knowledge," which derives from the word 
"gnosis" classically connotes an emphasis on the mind rather than the body. Knowledge 
is in the mind; the laws of nature are the ideas of God, driving, operating the physical, the 
manifest that ex-ists after the essential idea. In this way, a rhetorical, narrativistic 
understanding that matter is subservient to the compelling, immaterial forces of 
mind/God has been made commonplace in science and in culture. In seeking objectivity, 
science seeks to discard its own body and become pure, uncorrupted mind. Science, then, 








o physically manifested phenomena 
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Science's attempt to relinquish the body is driven by the will to be transfigured, the desire 
to be God, having all possible perspectives accounted for from nowhere/everywhere in 
time-space. This desire can be analyzed as having a two-pronged trajectory: 1) the desire 
to have god-like power over nature and 2) the desire to be removed from a shifting, 
unwieldy, threatening nature. 
Evelyn Fox Keller traces the development of the scientific consciousness, which 
she feels is debilitatingly entrenched in categories of subject/object and mind/body, from 
its roots in Plato. 
" ... The particular relation ofmind to nature on which our own science is based ... [is due, 
in part] to Platonic epistemology that has continued to reverberate throughout Western 
intellectual history ... By restricting knowledge to the domain of theory (as distinct from 
experiment) and nature to the realm of forms (as distinct from matter) Plato is able to 
map out a path to knowledge guided by love (Eros), and insulated from the aggression 
both he and his culture associate with sensible, material, and female nature. "xxx 
Keller attributes the general Athenian biases against the coupled images of femininity and 
nature, and Plato's in particular to a widespread homoerotic impulse in ancient Graeco-
Roman culture. This trend in sexuality in ancient Greece is commonly referred to and 
acknowledged. 
"The union of mind with the essential nature of things is a union of like with like; 
accordingly, it is taken for granted throughout the Symposium and Phaedrus that Eros, 
which is significant as a step towards the world of Being is homosexual"xxxi 
Keller's explanation of Plato's epistemology is characteristic of her tendency to privilege 
psycho-cultural factors in the development of what she calls the "scientific 
consciousness." She is not a thoroughgoing social-constructivist about science, but she is 
willing to have a look at the non-scientific, narrativistic in science as a necessary, 




I feel it is important here to briefly mention that neither Keller nor I are 
suggesting that science's missteps are entirely due to an inherently homosexual 
opposition between feminine-nature and masculine-mind tropes. Keller is, admittedly, 
showing where science has come from in order to accentuate the fact that it does not have 
to continue along in the same way. But in the process of her argument, Keller makes it 
clear that she is against any and all gender identifications. That goes for the animate as 
well as the inanimate. In fact, it is the association between femininity and nature that is 
at issue here and not some necessary, maladaptive disassociation between homosexual 
men and femininity in whatever form. Since the terms with which we have traditionally 
made sense of the dichotomy between mind and nature are gendered though, Keller 
makes some suggestions about a feasible feminist science that is able to work according 
to a vocabulary of traditional gender categories. She suggests that, 
"the only imaginable model that might have offered ·an instance of reciprocal 
consummated sexuality, not automatically evoking aggression and inviting domination, 
would have come either from female homosexual experience or from a female 
. hi' "xxxii perspectIve on eterosexua expenence. 
The lack of "a female perspective on heterosexual experience" is perfectly illustrated in 
the case of Francis Bacon. 
With Bacon, science takes up a hands-on, experimental philosophy, wherein "The 
object of study is no longer the Platonic Forms, a rarefied distillate of male sexuality, but 
material nature, the corporeal frame of female sexuality."xxxiii As is to be expected, the 
feminine, nature, is subjugated by the masculine, mind. Bacon writes, "Let us establish a 
chaste and lawful marriage between mind and nature. "xxxiv Keller continues along 
psychoanalytic lines in criticizing Bacon's science. She uses a specific psychoanalytic 
approach called "object relations theory." Object relations theory is primarily concerned 
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with the variety of cognitive inclinations that tend to accompany a growing sense of 
autonomous identity in relation to the world and other individuals. As far as I can tell, 
the theory succeeds at being Freudian, without incorporating Freud's basic sexism. It is 
immediately interested in early cognitive stages, which, it is argued, are not stages of 
self-identification, but rather stages of "connectedness." Freud also considers early 
cognitive stages to be about "connectedness" or union with the mother. The maturation 
process can only begin once the individual identifies his or her autonomy or 
disconnectedness. This is the birth of the self. And along with this birth comes the 
splitting of the mind and the body, the subject and the object, the self and the other. For 
Keller, object relations theory is thoroughgoing in its explanatory power. From Plato to 
Bacon to contemporary science, the goal is as rigorous a split as possible. 
"Having divided the world into two parts - the knower (mind) and the knowable (nature) 
- scientific ideology goes on to prescribe a very specific relation between the two. It 
prescribes the interactions which can consummate this union, that is, which can lead to 
knowledge. Not only are mind and nature assigne<i gender, but in characterizing 
scientific and objective thought as masculine, the very activity by which the knower can 
acquire knowledge is also genderized. The relation specified between knower and known 
is one of distance and separation. It is that between a subject and an object radically 
divided, which is to say, no worldly relation. Simply put, nature is objectified."xxxv 
When the insistence on this split is put in terms of psychoanalysis, we arrive at an 
interesting applied incarnation of Freudianism. Freud recommends extricating oneself 
from that connectedness with the mother/world for the sake of the civilizing process. 
Repression is the golden key to an enlightened, albeit discontented polity. So far as 
Keller is concerned though, the repression is too fierce in the case of science; the divorce 
between the subject and the object has become irreconcilable. "The oedipal boy's wish 
to become the father of himself [has become] ... a way of doing without the mother. "xxxvi 




being; it is also seen as a denial of the feminine for the sake of purity and objectivity. 
Helene Cixous seems to penetrate this fierce extremity of the scientific consciousness in 
her article/poem, "Sorties." 
" ... And dream of masculine 
filiation, dream of God the father 
emerging from himself 
in his son, - and 
no mother then ... 
so no mother then ?"xxxvii 
Previously, we discussed "cognitive repression" as an explanatory model for the 
lack of consensus amongst scientists about the meaning and use-value of quantum 
mechanics. Now that we have explored the disposition of the scientific consciousness in 
more depth, it is appropriate to work towards a more precise explanation for science's 
refusal to incorporate quantum mechanics into its narrative consciousness. Keller 
describes in detail the diversity of explanations that have been offered in order to make 
sense of quantum mechanics according to the classical conceptual paradigm. She then 
describes a range of positions taken by some physicists that she groups together due to a 
single commonality in approach. The commonality is that they offer "subjective 
interpretations of quantum mechanics - all loosely associated with the Copenhagen 
Interpretation."xxxviii Not surprisingly, the Copenhagen Interpretation hasn't enjoyed a lot 
of support among physicists. In fact, "In an effort to escape from this quagmire, theorists 
have proposed more and more outlandish alternatives. "xxxix Keller wastes no time in 
attributing this to the fact that subjective interpretations are not in accordance with the 
classical tradition. She states, "As with the child who is caught between cognitive 
paradigms, the ingenuity that physicists have displayed is quite impressive. "xl 
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"As such, it militates against the acceptance of a more realistic, more mature, and more 
humble relation to the world in which the boundaries between subject and object are 
acknowledged to be never quite rigid and in which knowledge of any sort is never quite · 
total. In such a frame, I suggest that the antinomies of quantum mechanics would no 
longer be so problematic."xli 
At the crux of her argument, Keller is asking science to admit its own arbitrary desire to 
and insistence on being objective, separated from and/or dominant over nature. In so 
doing, Keller is implicitly calling for a shifting of paradigms within science. It is 
important to note that her criticisms of science are not ironically based on a truth concept 
that is imaginably able to escape superstition, as are Lewontin's. She discards the notion 
of truth, or at least "total" truth, for the sake of a set of values, which she deems more 
admirable, namely, maturity, humility and sensitivity. She is unwilling to disregard 
science altogether, since it is, for her, undeniably successful and useful. Rather, she 
suggests a rehashing of some of the basic premises of the scientific endeavor. For 
science to accept Keller's proposal, it must admit subjectivity into the stated set of active 
variables in experimentation. 
It is important to be c~reful not to slide all the way on the slippery slope of post-
structuralism here. By embracing the subjective, creative, narrativistic elements in 
science, Keller is certainly stepping in that direction. Derrida exemplifies the extreme 
stance that post-structuralism takes on "truth," and by implication, the stance it takes on 
any intellectual tradition that can trace its roots to Plato, science not withstanding. By 
erasing the difference between the signifier and the signified - collapsing the duality into 
a floating, playing signifier-system that hovers over the specter of the transcendental 
signified - by making everything a text without a source or a speaker - Derrida is, 
effectively, reducing the fraction of appearance over reality, myth over truth, and so on to 
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a common denominator that is overtly oppositional to the foundations of scientific 
thinking. 
"F or there are two heterogeneous ways of erasing the difference between the signifier and 
the signified: one, the classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the signifier, that is to 
say, ultimately in submitting the sign to thought; the other, the one we are using here 
against the other one, consists in putting into question the system in which the preceding 
reduction functioned: first and foremost, the opposition between the sensible and the 
intelligible. For the paradox is that the metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the 
opposition it was reducing. The opposition is systematic with the reduction."xlii 
Here is deconstruction in all of its confusing, eventually self-destructing ironies. It 
utilizes the equation of truth with "thought" in order to turn the equation in on itself, and 
render truth a discourse always-already at play in the physical body/text. Derrida extends 
his argument to deconstruct all of the basic oppositions that privilege the pre-linguistic or 
transcendent idea over matter. In particular, he takes up " ... the opposition between 
nature and culture," with which Levi-Strauss is concerned. Foucalt puts the equation of 
truth and discourse to work as well, but he is more interested in the applications this 
thinking might have for power relationships. Foucalt is ultimately concerned with the 
arbitrariness (ungroundedness or uncenteredness) of power. He calls his project 
"critique." "Critique is the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to 
question truth on its effects of power and to question power on its discourses of truth. "xliii 
Keller is certainly engaged in this type of "critique" or questioning of power, but 
ultimately, she is interested in maintaining some notion of actual truth. That is, at no 
point does truth degrade into a purely physical, structural discourse of play for her, as it 
does for Derrida. Instead, Keller advises science to seek the truth, while keeping in mind 
the inevitable subjectivity of the pursuit. 
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Should science admit, at least partial subjectivity into the lab - as Keller suggests 
it ought to - will it provide more "pleasure" for the analyst; that is, will it diminish its use 
of forms and types and apprehend, with an increasing subtlety, the elusive - never 
definitive - perhaps, never knowable - actuality of becoming? Another way ,to ask this 
question is: if we relieve science of some its long standing and now, constitutive 
repression, will it become more erotic? If we are to take Keller's cognitive approach in 
answering this question, we must suppose that a less mind-heavy, more feeling science, a 
science which would acknowledge its connected-never-completely-objective point of 
departure will indeed proceed in resisting forcing or subjugating nature into predictably 
repetitious types. Repression will ebb in the scientific consciousness resulting in a lack 
of rigorously forced distinctions, such as self from other. This progression from the 
subject/object dichotomy to the subject/object relationship has been aspired to and 
expressed in different terms by Roland Barthes. 
" ... The present configuration of forces: on the one hand, a mass banalization (linked to 
the repetition of language) - a banalization outside of bliss but not necessarily outside of 
pleasure - and on the other, a (marginal, eccentric) impulse toward the New - a desperate 
impulse that can reach the point of destroying discourse: an attempt to reproduce in 
historical terms the bliss repressed beneath the stereotype. The opposition (the knife of 
value) is not necessarily between consecrated, named contraries (materialism and 
idealism, revolution and reform, etc.); but it is always and throughout between the 
exception and the rule."xliv 
F or me, it is not that the new science needs to be marginal or eccentric, or that it needs to 
go to the extreme point of "destroying discourse." Neither of these are necessary in order 
for it to be "between the exception and the rule," not discounting either, but embracing 
each, in turn, by virtue of its use value. 
Donna Haraway seems equally interested in this type of science and this treatment 
of an elusive factuality. 
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"I wish to translate the ideological dimensions of 'facticity' and 'the organic' into a 
cumbersome entity called a 'material-semiotic actor.' This unwieldy term is intended to 
highlight the object of knowledge as an active, meaning generating axis of the apparatus 
of bodily production, without ever implying immediate presence of such objects or, what 
is the same thing, their final or unique determination of what can count as objective 
knowledge at a particular historical juncture. "xlv 
Here, Haraway seems able to negotiate a tricky compromise between "material" actuality 
and "semiotic" meaning production. She will not grant the object "immediate presence," 
which would amount to immanent being or transcendence - for Haraway, becoming is 
simply not accessible in that way - but she will grant it materiality, which translates to a 
posited actuality beyond the mind. Haraway and, to some extent Barthes. seem to be 
offering a middle ground, wherein objectivity is not given up completely, but it is 
portioned out to subjective knowers. In so doing, they usher in the pleasure of the body -
not denying it, not repressing it totally - while still allowing for the thinking mind, the 
individualized consciousness. 
It is important to recognize that this recommendation for science, based on an 
analysis of its consciousness, is - like the science of objectivity, which we have given 
therapy - just another constructed feasibility. Its suggested normative standards are 
based on non-discovered, subjective values, which are admittedly arbitrary or, at least, 
absolutely unjustifiable. These reformative suggestions will not be made under the guise 
of Truth. Narrativistic science seems to me and to some of the metascientists I treat here 
to be a better program because it works according to a more acceptable strategy of 
respectful, sympathetic knowledge and action. 
IV. Nature/Culture 
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I will now use science to make a point. The science I am using is, as it will be 
shown, not the science of separation and objectivity, but the enactment of a more 
creative, subjective, feeling science. This must be allowed within the recommended 
boundaries of a self-and-other-defining, narrativistic science because it self-consciously 
and explicitly performs the narrativistic act, relinquishing its view from absolute 
nowhere. 
In 1983 Barbara McClintock was awarded the Nobel Prize in the field of 
physiology and medicine for her work on the theory of "gene transposition." Gene 
transposition basically is a theory of environmental influence over the structure of DNA. 
Keller recounts McClintock' s findings in laypersons terms: 
"Since needs are relative to the environmental context and hence subject to change, 
transposition, by application, indirectly allows for the possibility of environmentally 
induced and genetically transmitted change in an organism."xlvi 
As McClintock argues herself, "genes function only with respect to the environment in 
which they are found." McClintock's findings are in direct opposition to Watson and 
Crick's original formulation of a model of genetic replication and organismal instruction. 
"According to their account, the vital information of the cell is encoded in the DNA. 
From there it is copied onto the RNA, which, in tum, is used as a blueprint for the 
production of the proteins responsible for genetic traits. In the picture that emerged -
DNA to RNA to protein - the DNA is posited as the central actor in the cell, the 
executive governor of cellular organization, itself remaining impervious to influence 
from the subordinate agents to which it dictates."xlvii 
If Keller's cognitive approach to the scientific consciousness is applicable here, it is on 
the basis that the model that understands genes as director-chromosomes fulfills a 
collective psychological desire on the part of Baconian science to have a basic division 
between the master and the servant, the mind and the body. In this case, genetic coding 
would take the place of something like the Ten Commandments (only more forceful) as 
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the ideal that precedes-dominates existence. This equation of the gene with the mind or 
the master is a longstanding point of contention in science. The "Master Molecule" 
concept was being tossed around in the discourse, even before the discovery of the 
structure of DNA. 
"The emphasis has been very strongly in favor of one of these ... The first we will 
designate as the 'Master Molecule' concept ... This is, in essence, the theory of the Gene, 
interpreted to suggest a totalitarian government. .. The second concept we will designate 
as the 'Steady State' concept. By this term ... we envision a dynamic self-perpetuating 
organization of a variety of molecular species which owes its specific properties not to 
the characteristic of anyone molecule, but to the functional relationships of these 
molecular species. "xlviii 
Evelyn Fox Keller has run up against a similar bias toward the "Master Molecule" 
model in her own work on "cellular slime molds." Keller developed a "pacemaker" 
theory of slime mold aggregation according to which, "The different morphologies 
appear through successive bifurcations of a single reaction-diffusion system and do not 
require the expression of new genetic information. "xlix Keller explains that her theory has 
been difficult to swallow in the scientific community because of" ... the predisposition to 
kinds of explanation that posit a single, central governor."l The ideologue science that 
looks for this kind of hierarchical structure, according to Keller, is too simple and 
shortsighted for her purposes. 
McClintock and Keller's strategies as scientists illustrate a more sensitive, less 
removed or divided approach to learning and knowledge, wherein, knowledge no longer 
becomes gnostic. Keller contrasts the views of Ernest Schachtel with those of 
McClintock in order to make the difference between the two approaches more explicit. 
Schachtel develops the concept of "focal attention." Focal attention enables us to 
"progress from mere wishing and wanting to thinking and knowing."li But Schachtel is 
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also interested in "poetic" faculties. He describes the poetic, as distinct from the 
scientific, as, "an experiential realization of the kinship between oneself and the other ... a 
realization [that] is made difficult by fear and by arrogance."lii The difference between 
Schachtel and McClintock, according to Keller, is that Schachtel divorces the "poetic" 
from the scientific, without any vision or hope for reconciliation between the two, 
whereas, McClintock traverses the boundaries by keeping vigilant of her kinship with the 
object of inquiry, by being sensitive to its own inclinations as well her own. As Keller 
puts it, McClintock has a "feelingfor the organism. "Iiii 
Barbara McClintock's theory of gene transposition and Evelyn Fox Keller's 
"pacemaker" theory of slime mold aggregation are posed here as the fruits of an 
alternative science. McClintock and Keller are not revolutionary in their approach, by 
any means; they both engage in the standard scientific methodology, to some extent. The 
difference is that McClintock and Keller conduct their investigations, not with absolute 
objectivity or complete truth reduced from materiality as an end in mind, but with a 
cooperative attitude toward the object. It is only according to their science that truth or 
objectivity can exist as a non-totalizing concept. 
McClintock and Keller have begun to show that nature and culture become each 
other by way of their interactive, "transposition[ing]" constitutions. Their findings are 
the results of a self-consciously reformed science. A science that - in the same way as 
literary studies ought to - pursues individually framed questions, phrased in the symbols 
and terminology appropriate to that field. Yet, on the cusps of both disciplines' 
systematics, there is a set of interwoven concerns: the same human dilemmas about how 




v. Pantheism as a Paradigm 
"The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective vision ... [Partial} 
objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and 
splitting of subject and object. In this way we might become answerable for what we 
learn how to see ... Sustaining the possibility of webs of connections is called solidarity in 
politics and shared conversations in epistemology. " 
-Donna J HarawayliV 
Bridging the gap between nature and culture by way of both scientific discovery 
and narrativistic, authorial bias towards connectedness renders the world, at certain 
repeating times and places, unified and concurrent. The present concurrence is not one of 
rigorous logic. We have not civilized ourselves into another monotheism, in which 
absolute transcendence and unification is achieved in the form of principles, immaterial 
ideas. Rather, by incorporating the subject into science and incorporating culture into 
nature, we have arrived at a system of "situated knowledges"IV of truth. These situated 
knowledges are accepted as coexisting, despite the apparent contradictions that may arise 
and thereby upset our preferences for order and logic. Truth is now rendered elusive and 
continually becoming due to the diversity of those subjectivities apprehending/creating it, 
but it is not so extremely relativistic as to become always "the exception," as Barthes puts 
it. We will affirm that there are common elements of experience and, eventually 
knowledge. This is on the basis that we are all of the same stuff, which is a little bit less 
than an arbitrary faith, at best. With only this as our assumed common ground, our 
recourse to working knowledge must be by way of cooperation and sympathy for (rather 
than dominance over) the other. 
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In her book Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, Donna Haraway recommends a 
science that does not insist on a rigorous division between objectivity and subjectivity. 
She goes one step further than I do here, traversing the boundaries between nature and 
culture, and then, traversing the boundaries between nature and culture's contrivance's -
technological contraptions, cyborgs. She considers the body a complicated web of 
communications technologies. Biological communications ... neurotransmitters, scripted 
genetic coding, nervous messages racing on currents of electricity - these are only the 
first types of life giving-limiting-perpetuating technologies. 
"My cyborg myth is about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous 
possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political 
work ... A cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people 
are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently 
partial identities and contradictory standpoints ... Communications sciences and biology 
are constructions of natural-technical objects of knowledge in which the difference 
between the machine and organism is thoroughly blurred; mind, body, and tool are on 
very intimate terms. ,,[vi 
By writing the body in terms of communications technology, Haraway is very clearly 
"blurring" the boundaries of body and machine. This rings true for me because the 
memory in my bodily tissue, my brain's lobes, is slowing being replaced by the 
databanks in my computer. Without spellchecker, my secret would be revealed: that third 
graders are often better spellers than I am. The importance of this blurred boundary of 
definition - between me and my personal computer - is the same as when we collapse 
our notions of nature and culture. That is, there is an allowance being made in both cases 
for an interactive-not-either-or strategy for knowledge, action, agency and identity. As 
Haraway suggests, this interactive relationship has liberating implications. It will not 
liberate us from the limitations that nature has set; rather, it will liberate us from the 
narrative we have constructed for nature and help us to author a new one, one that is not 
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totally removed, "unlocatable" or "irresponsible" for the limitations and determinations 
of nature, but one that is inclined to assign alternative significances to those 
determinations. 
Haraway's blurring of basic dichotomies puts us in a position to re-ask the 
question about science: does the division between mind and body or subject and object, 
which takes its cognitive prompt from the psychological phenomenology of 
connectedness and separation leave us . with a new epistemological scheme? If absolute 
objectivity or separateness from the body is relinquished as a feasible, desirable or even 
justifiable ambition, what can be salvaged of our notion of objectivity? For Haraway, 
partial knowledge is what should be built into our concept of objectivity. 
"We need to learn in our bodies, endowed with primate colour and stereoscopic vision, 
how to attach the object to our theoretical and political scanners in order to name where 
we are and are not, in dimensions of mental and physical space we hardly know how to 
name. "Ivii 
To call this kind of ambition for an explicitly stated subjectivity report "objective" seems 
like calling a red apple green. However, Haraway suggests that some trace of objectivity 
resides here. This is her way of making" ... an argument for situated and embodied 
knowledges against various forms of unlocatable, and so irresponsible, knowledge" 
claims. Irresponsible means unable to be called into account."lviii Absolute subjectivity 
is as undesirable then as rigorously distant, disassociated objectivity. For Haraway, 
"unlocatable" = "irresponsible." And location must be sought on some common ground 
between autonomous subjectivities by way of mutually affirmative, mutually expressive 
communication. 
"The alternative to relativism is partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the 
possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in 
epistemology. "iix 
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Shared conversations, with recourse to individual responsibility for claims, are 
conversations in a world that does not divide its subjects and its objects rigidly; it allows 
for some blurring, some contradiction, some messiness and some mind changing. It is 
the very non-essential, shared-substance of becoming. It is between the extremes of 
absolute objectivity and subjective relativism. 
The basis for this blurring of boundaries, this bringing together - this 
reconciliation - is pantheism ... the basis for the reconciliation between science and 
narrative is epistemological and academic pantheism. The basis for the reconciliation of 
the mind and the body, and on a larger scale, between nature and culture is ontological 
pantheism. McClintock's theory of gene transposition and Keller's research into slime 
mold aggregation can be put to work as evidence - not evidence as objective grounding, 
but as workable discovery and narrative creation - for the interconnectedness of nature 
and culture. One writes the other with its genes and the other, to some extent, chooses 
how to read, or how the writing will be "expressed." There is a bond then, between these 
traditionally oppositional concepts; there is a common ground. We are working 
according to "a doctrine that the universe [is] conceived of as a whole: the doctrine that 
there is no God but the combined forces and laws that are manifested in the existing 
universe. "Ix 
The concept of difference must be worked into our pantheism because, while we 
agree to work according to an academic as well as ontological reconciliation, wherein 
there are no absolutely disparate fields of inquiry or existence, we also must agree to 
admit that we do not, and perhaps, can never know exactly the nature and intention of the 
apparent other. This is especially the case for academic fields as collective 
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consclousnesses. The cognitive themes of literary studies and those of science will 
always be only partial, according to whatever is directly proper to the discipline. 
"The knowing self is partial in all of its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and 
original; it is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to 
join with another, to see together without claiming to be another."lxi 
The self, which is cognitively separate from the other - otherwise it can not be the self 
(inherent to the concept of the self is the separation from or proportional relationship with 
the other or the Other) - can still, regardless of its disconnectedness, engage the other so 
that the two can "see together." 
Seeing together necessarily involves an act of belief or affirmation beyond the 
apprehensions of whatever partiality. The fact that the necessity or prerequisite for a 
community is "seeing together" - which, inextricably involves seeing beyond 
individuality - implies a religious conception of the relationship between consciousness 
and world. Or, if we are to be precise, implies a partially religious conception and a 
partially objective - never complete - conception of the basis for knowledge. This is the 
reason I choose religious terminology. 
If we are to put our pantheism into practice, we must consider the consequences 
for the subject and the object, which remain intact, but are more intimately related now. 
Ifwe posit the object as becoming, as both influential/authorial over us and 
influenced/read by us, we must no longer treat it as passive or inert. Neither must we 
treat nature or some part of it as our "Master Molecule." Instead, we must treat it as 
subject. For every self, as it is distinguished from the other, must affirm that that other is, 
indeed a subjective self, as well. This is the sameness in the other, the repetition in 
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difference, the pantheism at the base of our manifested individualized consciousnesses. 
This and no other is the equality we must affirm in order to make justice. 
" ... [Be] most insistent on some version of the world as active subject, not as resource to 
be mapped and appropriated in bourgeois, Marxist, or masculinist projects."lxii 
Perhaps, treating the world as active subject will encourage a conversation between us. 
The academic conversation will be between science and narrative, whose boundaries 
should be partially, at times, transgressed; this will be the enactment of a reformative 
cultural studies, a metametascience.· And between nature and culture, whose cooperative, 
interactive relationship will be the constitutive give-and-take of our narrative of progress 
as we continue to discover and rediscover, construct and deconstruct it as a function of 
our ever-changing values. Admittedly, even reconciliation is a function of my values, my 
relatively arbitrary prioritizing of cooperation over domination and relation over 
disconnection. 
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